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291 
THE FREEDOM OF NON-SPEECH 
FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS. Mark V. Tushnet,1 
Alan K. Chen,2 and Joseph Blocher.3 NYU Press. 2017. Pp. 
vii + 260. $28.00 (Cloth). 
Enrique Armijo4 
INTRODUCTION 
How does one achieve eternal bliss? By saying dada. How does 
one become famous? By saying dada . . . . How can one get rid 
of everything that smacks of journalism, worms, everything nice 
and right, blinkered, moralistic, europeanised, enervated? By 
saying dada . . . . 
I don’t want words that other people have invented. All the 
words are other people’s inventions. I want my own stuff, my 
own rhythm, and vowels and consonants too, matching the 
rhythm and all my own.5 
On the evening of August 29, 1952, at Maverick Concert 
Hall, an open-air theater deep in the Catskill Mountains’ forest 
preserve on the outskirts of Woodstock, New York, the virtuoso 
pianist David Tudor strode out onstage before an unsure 
audience, sat at a piano, set a stopwatch, closed the keyboard lid, 
and for 30 seconds, did nothing. He then opened the lid, reclosed 
it, reset the watch, and sat silently again for an additional 2 
 
 1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  
 2.  William M. Beaney Memorial Research Chair Professor, University of Denver 
Sturm College of Law. 
 3.  Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
 4.  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Associate Professor, Elon University 
School of Law; Affiliate Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project. Thanks to 
Vincent Blasi, Joseph Blocher, Alan Chen, Heidi Kitrosser, Kate Klonick, Helen Norton, 
David Pozen, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Alexander Tsesis, Mark Tushnet, Morgan 
Weiland, and to colleagues at the 2017 Loyola University Chicago Constitutional Law 
Colloquium and Yale Law School Information Society Project Freedom of Expression 
Scholars Conference for comments and suggestions. Thanks as well to Britney Boles and 
Helen Tsiolkas for research assistance. 
 5. Hugo Ball, Dada Manifesto (1916), https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dada_
Manifesto_ (1916,_Hugo_Ball) (last updated June 11, 2017). 
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minutes and 23 seconds. He opened and closed the lid, again sat 
silently at the piano keys for another timed minute and 40 
seconds, stood up, and walked offstage.6 
Though Tudor was careful to make no audible sounds during 
the performance, the sheet music at his piano was not blank. The 
composer’s notation read “Tacet.7 For any instrument or 
instruments.” The score noted three movements and their lengths, 
demarcated in the performance by Tudor’s opening and closing of 
the piano’s keyboard lid, and, in a subsequent recreation of the 
score, a series of vertical lines intended to indicate the passage of 
time.8 
Composer John Cage, the author of that score, would say that 
the piece, then tentatively called Four Movements, later named 
4’33” after its total length, was inspired by artist Robert 
Rauschenberg’s White Paintings, which Cage had encountered at 
a Rauschenberg solo show the year before Tudor’s performance.9 
The White Paintings were five paneled works “painted on canvas 
in a smooth, unmodulated white.”10 Cage interpreted the images 
not as a means to project the artist’s own expression, but rather as 
“backdrops against which the flux of the world might stand out.”11 
Cage would describe the White Paintings as “mirrors of the air,” 
and “airports for the lights, shadows, and particles” of the rooms 
in which the paintings were displayed.12 Their lack of form focused 
the viewer’s attention on naturally occurring images, such as the 
changes in light and shadow in the surrounding space. The 
message Rauschenberg sought to communicate could only be 
expressed by stripping away the paintings’ content. When he 
began work on a new set of White Paintings, Rauschenberg 
instructed his assistant to “[p]aint them so they look like they 
 
 6. See KYLE GANN, NO SUCH THING AS SILENCE: JOHN CAGE’S 4’33’ 2–3 (2010); 
Will Hermes, The Story of 4’33”, NPR (May 8, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org
/2000/05/08/1073885/4-33. 
 7.  Latin for “is silent,” tacet is a musical scoring term meant to indicate that an 
instrument or voice does not sound.  
 8.  GANN, supra note 6, at 178–80. 
 9.  John Cage: An Autobiographical Statement, JOHN CAGE (Apr. 17, 1990), 
http://www.johncage.org/autobiographical_statement.html; GANN, supra note 6, at 111. 
 10.  MORGAN FALCONER, PAINTING BEYOND POLLOCK 168 (2015). 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Francesca Wilmott, Composing Silence: John Cage and Black Mountain College, 
INSIDE/OUT BLOG (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.moma.org/explore/inside_out/2014/01/03/
composing-silence-john-cage-and-black-mountain-college-3/.  
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haven’t been painted.”13 
With 4’33”, Cage sought to supply the same aesthetic 
experience through musical composition. The work’s use of 
silence, when combined with the socially self-imposed silence of 
the concert hall,14 was intended to frame the other sounds that 
occurred in that space during that time, both natural and man-
made. By composing a soundless score, Cage sought to teach the 
audience to listen for those sounds that are all around them that 
modern society had trained them to forget were there. Writing 
about that first 1952 performance, Cage said of the audience that 
[w]hat they thought was silence, because they didn’t know how 
to listen, was full of accidental sounds. You could hear the wind 
stirring outside during the first movement. During the second, 
raindrops began pattering on the roof, and during the third the 
people themselves made all kinds of interesting sounds as they 
talked or walked out.15 
Despite—indeed because of—its lack of compositional 
sound, 4’33” thus serves, as critic and composer James Pritchett 
writes, as “a tribute to the experience of silence, a reminder of its 
existence and its importance for all of us.”16 It is only through 
silence, Cage believed, that we can notice the “permanent 
presence of the sounds all around us,” and can come to learn that 
those sounds are “worthy of attention.”17 In today’s wireless, 
cacophonous, and ever-connected world, this is a reminder that 
we need more than ever. 
* * * 
The story of 4’33”’s inspiration, composition, first 
performance, and evolving meaning is not merely a story about a 
 
 13. Brice Marden, Statement Accompanying Podcast, Robert Rauschenberg: Among 
Friends, MOMA, https://www.moma.org/audio/playlist/40/639.  
 14.  As critic Douglas Kahn writes, Cage “extended the decorum of silencing by 
extending the silence imposed on the audience to the performer.” Douglas Kahn, John 
Cage: Silence and Silencing, 81 MUSICAL Q. 556, 560 (1997). See also GANN, supra note 6, 
at 19 (4’33” “called upon the audience to remain obediently silent under unusual 
conditions”).  
 15.  GANN, supra note 6, at 4. See ROBERT KOSTELANETZ, CONVERSING WITH CAGE 
70 (2003). 
 16.  James Pritchett, What Silence Taught John Cage: The Story of 4’33”, Rose White 
Music: The piano in my life (2009), http://rosewhitemusic.com/piano/writings/silence-
taught-john-cage/. 
 17.  MICHAEL NYMAN, EXPERIMENTAL MUSIC: CAGE AND BEYOND 26 (2d ed. 
1999).  
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work of silence. Rather, it is a story about a work whose author 
decided that the work be silent, and a story of the message that 
the work intended to communicate—a message that could only be 
expressed by not communicating, in particular the use of silence 
to demonstrate that, as Cage said, “there’s no such thing as 
silence.”18 It is a story of expressive choice, in particular Cage’s 
decision to reject locution so as to convey his intended meaning.19 
Which means that for First Amendment scholars, it presents a test 
case. 
In their illuminating and timely new book, Free Speech 
Beyond Words, Mark Tushnet, Alan Chen, and Joseph Blocher 
ask whether the First Amendment applies to expression that, like 
4’33”, but also like Lewis Carroll’s nonsense poem Jabberwocky 
or Jackson Pollock’s splatter painting, does not use words or 
conventionally representational imagery. It is a question that, as 
the authors show, the United States Supreme Court has long 
assumed has an affirmative answer. Even though such works do 
not use words to express ideas or otherwise convey meaning, and 
even though the Court is asking whether such works are within 
“the freedom of speech,” the Court has unanimously declared that 
they are “unquestionably shielded” by the Speech Clause (p. 2).20 
The question that Tushnet, Chen, and Blocher seek to answer is 
why that is so. 
Why ask why such works are “shielded” by the First 
Amendment, then, especially since the Court has long treated the 
answer as a given? According to the authors, the Court runs 
doctrinal risks when it glides past what Frederick Schauer calls the 
“coverage” First Amendment question in its rush to reach the 
“protection” question.21 Tushnet et al. begin with the unassailable 
premise that communication involves much more than the use of 
 
 18. KOSTELANETZ, supra note 15, at 70. 
 19.  According to linguistic philosopher J. L. Austin, “A locutionary act has to do with 
the simple act of a speaker saying something, i.e. the act of producing a meaningful 
linguistic expression.” YAN HUANG, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PRAGMATICS 176 
(2012). 
 20.  Quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 568–69 (1995). 
 21. As Schauer and the authors note, the First Amendment’s boundaries—what it 
protects—are “far more consequential” than the doctrinal work that comes after an 
affirmative answer to the coverage question—i.e., whether the speech-affecting regulation 
is content-based or content-neutral and the like. (p. 2, citing Frederick Schauer, The 
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 
117 HARV. L REV. 1765, 1767 (2004)).  
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words to convey meaning, and thus “speech” for First 
Amendment purposes must entail more than that as well (p. 1). 
But that premise cannot alone drive the Court’s conclusion that 
wordless communication is covered by the Amendment. 
Setting the boundaries of the First Amendment is a project 
of determining coverage, not protection, and we need 
independent justifications for finding coverage exists in order for 
free speech law to cohere. Additionally, ignoring coverage is 
doubly dangerous, the authors argue, precisely because the tools 
the Court uses in deciding the protection question have become 
so settled in favor of protecting speech, while the tools for 
determining coverage questions are, in many cases and to borrow 
John Cage’s term, tacet.22 First Amendment protection rules are 
so outcome-determinative that the answer to the protection 
question in cases like U.S. v. Stevens,23 Sorrell v. IMS Health,24 and 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association25 is doing 
boundary-setting work which should properly be addressed at the 
preliminary point of deciding whether First Amendment coverage 
exists or not (p. 3). 
This approach, in the view of the authors, is exactly 
backwards. The question of what the First Amendment covers is 
a more consequential question than whether the First 
Amendment protects a particular speaker or group of speakers in 
a particular case.26 Yet the Court continually bogs down in the 
application of First Amendment rules where the outcome with 
respect to those rules is in little doubt, and with almost no rigorous 
predicate analysis of whether the First Amendment applies in the 
first instance. 
A look at the Court’s recent work bears this reading out. 
Pages are a rough proxy at best for the depth of legal analysis 
 
 22. See supra note 7. To be sure and as discussed infra, some historical or theoretical 
approaches are occasionally used to decide coverage questions in First Amendment cases. 
The test from Spence v. Washington is one such approach. But the Court’s applications of 
these tools to coverage questions is so intermittent and inconsistent that they may as well 
say almost nothing at all. 
 23. U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 24.  Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 25.  Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 26.  See also Schauer, supra note 21, at 1767 (“[Q]uestions about the involvement of 
the First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the 
issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords the speech 
to which it applies. Once the First Amendment shows up, much of the game is over.”). 
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within those pages.27 But to demonstrate the authors’ premise, 
below is a chart showing the three aforementioned First 
Amendment cases, the length of the slip opinions in those cases, 
and the approximate amount of discussion, as measured by pages 
in those opinions, that the Court’s members spend analyzing the 
coverage question with respect to the claim at issue as opposed to 
the protection question: 
 
Case Total 
pages 
Coverage analysis Protection 
analysis 
Stevens 52 5 pp. (maj. op.) 
9 pp. (diss.) 
 
11 pp. (maj. op.) 
9 pp. (diss.) 
Sorrell 53 6 pp. (maj. op.) 
0 p. (diss.) 
 
16 pp. (maj. op.) 
24 pp. (diss.) 
Brown 92 ½ p. (maj. op.)28 
0 p. (concur. op.)29 
20 pp. (Thomas diss.)30 
0 p. (Breyer diss.) 
 
15 pp. (maj. op.) 
0 p. (concur. op.) 
0 p. (Thomas diss.) 
12 pp. (Breyer diss.) 
 
Putting aside Justice Thomas’ dissent in Brown—his 
commitment to original public meaning-based interpretation 
causes Thomas to sometimes be an outlier on the current Court 
with respect to treatment of First Amendment coverage 
 
 27. Perhaps this Review’s length proves the point. 
 28. In Brown, California, which was defending its statute prohibiting the sale of 
violent video games to minors against First Amendment challenge, acknowledged that 
“video games qualify for First Amendment protection.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Assoc., 
564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). 
 29.  Justice Alito, joined in concurring in the judgment by Justice Scalia, would have 
invalidated the California statute on facial vagueness grounds and thus would not have 
reached the First Amendment coverage and protection questions. Id. at 807 (Alito, J., 
concurring in judgment).  
 30.  Justice Thomas’ dissent in Brown argued that the original public meaning of the 
First Amendment could not have understood the “freedom of speech” to include a right 
to speak to children without their parents’ consent, and thus the Amendment did not cover 
the right of video game manufacturers to sell their games to children. Id. at 821 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
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questions31—the contrast within this admittedly small sample size 
is stark. The Court spent more than triple the amount of time in 
its opinions’ pages discussing the extent of the First Amendment’s 
protection as it did discussing whether the First Amendment 
applied to the relevant communicative acts at all. This is a bizarre 
way to decide cases.32 
First of all, it carves out the First Amendment from the 
hardiest canon of construction in all of public law: the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance.33 Of course, the more conventional 
version of constitutional avoidance instructs that courts should 
strive to interpret statutes so as to avoid raising constitutional 
questions. But an analogous form of constitutional avoidance 
occurs when, as A. E. Dick Howard notes, the Court “pass[es] up 
a more difficult constitutional question in favor of another which, 
albeit constitutional, was hardly controversial.”34 As the authors 
write, “[t]he whole point of treating the First Amendment as 
having boundaries is to avoid in-depth analysis of cases involving 
uncovered conduct” (p. 4, emphasis in original). If the Court were 
to actually engage the question of First Amendment coverage, it 
could dispense with protection questions when it had before it an 
allegedly communicative act that was not sufficiently expressive 
to fall within the Amendment. But because protection doctrine is 
well developed (some might instead say larded up), with its many 
multipart tests and tiers of scrutiny, and coverage doctrine is 
largely an act of assumption, legal analysis is pulled toward 
questions which have existing tools available to answer them. It is 
temptingly easy to apply longstanding doctrines and balancing 
tests that weigh speaker and state interests, and similarly tempting 
 
 31. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(finding that “the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student 
speech in public schools.”). 
 32. Though the Court’s foundational First Amendment coverage cases were written 
at a time when opinions were much less verbose, they similarly spend very little time 
developing a coverage doctrine that can be applied in subsequent cases. See Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (one paragraph); Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (four paragraphs). 
 33.  See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (labeling 
the Brandeis opinion in Ashwander “one of the most respected opinions ever written by a 
Member of this Court”).  
 34. A. E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. 
IN BRIEF 76, 84 (2012) (discussing the Court’s avoidance of the First Amendment question 
in favor of a more straightforward vagueness question in Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 
567 U.S. 239 (2011)).  
3 - ARMIJO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 1:48 PM 
298 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:291 
 
to assume coverage exists because there are fewer tools to answer 
that question. But by placing its focus on protection over 
coverage, the Court is choosing the question that is superficially 
more difficult, but is in fact more straightforward, and certainly 
less controversial. 
Without clear guideposts for lower courts concerning what 
the First Amendment covers and what it does not, those courts 
are forced to follow the Supreme Court’s lead and assume 
coverage—that is, assume the Constitution’s applicability to the 
allegedly expressive act in question—and then apply protection 
doctrine. This is the exact opposite order of decision elsewhere in 
constitutional law, where the analysis begins, and often ends, with 
whether the Constitution applies to the individual’s act. For 
example, in the substantive due process area, every case begins 
with a careful description of the right being asserted, followed by 
an analysis of whether that right is sufficiently fundamental to fall 
within the liberty component of the Due Process Clause.35 
Consider too the Second Amendment, as manifested in the 
District of Columbia v. Heller case—there the majority and 
dissenting opinions spent dozens of pages analyzing whether the 
Amendment covered the use and possession of guns in self-
defense.36 In other areas of constitutional law, if the answer to the 
coverage question is in the negative, the analysis in effect ends 
there, other than some pro forma analytical t-crossing and i-
dotting with respect to whether the law in question is rational. 
Coverage, not protection, is the battleground upon which most of 
the constitutional questions of the day are fought—except battles 
over the freedom of speech. 
So, there is little doubt that Free Speech Beyond Words 
identifies an analytic gap in the Court and academy’s First 
Amendment work. The next question up for answer is how well 
the authors fill it. As I discuss in detail below, the book’s three 
 
 35.  See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not cover the “claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in 
the act of sodomy”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The asymmetry 
I discuss above is doubly strange given that the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis in the substantive 
due process area largely mirrors the analysis used in Speech Clause cases.  
 36. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also Joseph Blocher and 
Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the 
Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 296 (2016) (quoting 
Schauer, supra note 21, in noting that per Heller, in cases involving bans on gun possession 
by felons and the mentally ill, the Second Amendment “just does not show up [at all]”). 
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authors each make novel and valuable contributions with respect 
to how we should think about constitutional coverage for 
“speech” that does not employ language or convey articulable 
ideas. But the book as a whole can be read another way: as a 
broadside, and extremely effective, critique of listener-based First 
Amendment theories and doctrines that hang the presence or 
absence of First Amendment coverage on, as the Court stated in 
Spence v. Washington, whether “the likelihood was great that a 
[speaker’s particularized message] would be understood by those 
who viewed it.”37 As the authors prove, the question whether an 
audience understands a speaker’s expressive act to convey a 
particular message fails to resolve, and even frustrates, 
meaningful inquiry into the issue of First Amendment coverage 
for works that do not use words or convey a particular idea. 
Indeed, perhaps a more accurate (though much less marketable) 
title for the book might have been Free Speech Beyond Spence. 
This Review proceeds as follows. Part I sets out and 
comments on Chen, Tushnet, and Blocher’s arguments. In Part II, 
I offer my own alternative, arguably more orthodox, framework 
for analyzing claims to First Amendment coverage for what I call 
“non-speech”—works of art and other expressive acts that, like 
those discussed by the authors, do not use language to 
communicate specifically articulable ideas. In brief, and drawing 
from other areas of constitutional law, I argue that the First 
Amendment covers not simply the act of expression, but also what 
comes before: the autonomy-based right to decide what to say. As 
discussed above, John Cage’s use of silence in 4’33” was 
unquestionably an expressive act, even though it used no words at 
all. Locating the Speech Clause’s protections earlier in the 
expressive act permits First Amendment doctrine to rest 
comfortably upon the idea that the Amendment covers 
expression that does not use words but that nevertheless is 
intended to communicate. 
4’33” may be expressive because of its deliberate use of 
silence, but it cannot follow that every use of silence necessarily 
constitutes an expressive act. Part III sets out potential problems 
associated with extending First Amendment coverage over 
expressive non-speech acts, pursuant either to the authors’ 
approaches or my own, in particular the need for limiting 
 
 37. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. 
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principles given a First Amendment theory and doctrine that 
seems, at least in recent cases and law journal articles, to only 
expand. If the First Amendment protects both speech and non-
speech, and everyone seems to agree that it does, then the final 
need is for tools to identify when conduct is neither speech nor 
non-speech—to draw the boundaries of First Amendment 
coverage in a way that is clear and predictable to speakers, 
lawmakers, and reviewing courts. 
I. TESTING COVERAGE’S BOUNDARIES 
A. THE EXPRESSIVE C# 
The first category of wordless expression that Free Speech 
Beyond Words takes on is instrumental music. The problem is 
straightforward, as expressed by Alan Chen, the author of this 
chapter: Why does the First Amendment independently cover the 
“musical, as opposed to [the] lyrical, component of such 
expression” (p. 15)? The First Amendment protects the lyrics of 
Jimi Hendrix’s Purple Haze, which came to Hendrix in a dream 
after having read a science fiction book called Night of Light by 
Philip José Farmer.38 Chen states that by all accounts, the 
Amendment protects the song’s opening guitar riff, independent 
of the protection for the lyrics.39 But why? If Hendrix had never 
put words to the song at all, why is it so clear that the First 
Amendment’s coverage would still apply? What is the theoretical 
basis for the conclusion that, for First Amendment purposes, 
instrumental music, which is wordless, is “constitutionally 
equivalent” to speech (p. 15)? 
Despite that call of the question, however, the issue is not 
hypothetical. As Chen shows, governments that have censored 
music have usually done so due to the music’s lyrical content, 
though this has not always been the case (p. 27). Nazi Germany 
 
 38. See Jason Heller, A Purplish Haze: The Science Fiction Vision of Jimi Hendrix, 
NOISEY (Mar. 14, 2017), https://noisey.vice.com/en_us/article/wnkgen/a-purplish-haze-the-
science-fiction-vision-of-jimi-hendrix. The novel refers to a “purplish haze” caused by a 
“huge moon, hanging dim and violet and malevolent above the horizon.” PHILIP JOSÉ 
FARMER, NIGHT OF LIGHT 34 (1966).  
 39. Chen points out that for many years the Catholic Church banned the musical 
interval  known as the tritone, which uses a diminished fifth, on the ground “its dissonant 
sound evoked evil,” and that the Church even labeled it the “Devil’s Interval” (p. 27). He 
does not note, however, that Hendrix used the Devil’s Interval in the opening to Purple 
Haze. KEITH SHADWICK, JIMI HENDRIX: MUSICIAN 96 (2003). 
3 - ARMIJO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 1:48 PM 
2018] THE FREEDOM OF NON-SPEECH 301 
 
enforced its visions of cultural purity by banning the performance 
and broadcast of what it called “degenerate music,” with the race 
of the music’s composer as the usual stand-in for degeneracy. 
Strict Islamists often ban instrumental music because of its 
associations with secular lifestyles and interests. And public 
schools here in the United States have been sued for barring 
students from playing religiously themed instrumental music 
during school-sanctioned programs (p. 29). 
Chen argues that constitutional coverage of instrumental 
music does not rest comfortably with any of the governing 
theories underlying the First Amendment. First, it is difficult to 
argue that music without lyrics serves either self-governance in 
the Meiklejohnian sense or public discourse in the Postian sense 
(pp. 32-33).40 Democracy-based rationales for the First 
Amendment are, as Chen notes, “simply unhelpful” (p. 35) in 
justifying constitutional protections for artistic expression. 
Though Chen does not put as fine a point on it as this, these 
rationales for the most part fail because they depend in large 
measure on an exchange of information between speaker and 
listener; however, a composition that no one other than the 
composer heard at all, instrumental or not, is certainly covered by 
the First Amendment, so coverage cannot depend on the 
transmissionary aspects of expression. A prudish Minnesota 
legislator who sought to prevent any of the hundreds of hours of 
music in Prince’s vault from being released would have about as 
much success in defending against a court challenge as he would 
in trying to ban Darling Nikki from the radio and record stores.41 
Similarly, truth-seeking rationales such as the marketplace of 
ideas don’t do the job of justifying coverage of instrumental 
music, since, as Chen notes, music without lyrics does not usually 
 
 40. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 888–89 (1948); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 
VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011). 
 41. See Nicole Lyn Pesce, Prince’s secret vault of unreleased music could produce 
albums for another 100 years, NY DAILY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/music/prince-secret-music-vault-produce-
albums-100-years-article-1.2611146. The lyrics of Darling Nikki, from Prince’s 1984 
multiplatinum, Grammy-winning album Purple Rain, were Tipper Gore’s primary 
inspiration for founding the Parents Music Resource Center, whom we have to thank for 
Parental Advisory stickers on the covers of plastic discs that used to contain digitized music 
called “CDs.” See Censor This: Music Censorship in America, INTERNET ARCHIVE: 
WAYBACK MACHINE https://web.archive.org/web/20030406085225/http://www.geocities.
com/fireace_00/pmrc.html (last visited Sep. 1, 2017).  
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communicate a specific idea; indeed, the primary expressive point 
of instrumental music is often to “say” what words cannot (p. 
37)—though he does note that marketplace-based theories fit well 
with coverage for instrumental music if one broadens the 
definition of “truth” to consider aesthetic or cultural truth. To the 
extent that current First Amendment theory supports coverage of 
instrumental music, autonomy theory is the best fit. As Chen 
argues, a composer may intend to communicate an idea through 
the use of music, or instead “have no intent at all except to create 
something beautiful . . . .” (p. 43). 
Having discussed the existing theoretical approaches to the 
coverage question, Chen then turns to specific rationales for First 
Amendment coverage of instrumental music that may or may not 
harmonize with those approaches. Chen notes correctly that 
performing and listening to lyric-less music have played essential 
roles in a host of areas of primary constitutional concern, from 
individual identity formation (think: a Deadhead spinning to the 
Grateful Dead’s Slipknot!) to cultural identity preservation 
(think: Tuvan throat singing by nomadic sheepherders in the 
Mongolian mountains) to nationalism (think: a march by John 
Philip Sousa). But Chen’s project is to justify an independent basis 
for First Amendment protection for instrumental music, and these 
examples do not provide especially compelling reasons 
supporting that distinction, since the analytical work they do is 
actually to collapse any distinction between instrumental and 
other kinds of music, or for that matter other forms of art. Hearing 
the Beatles on The Ed Sullivan Show played a critical role on the 
identity formation of millions of American youngsters. Whitney 
Houston’s Star-Spangled Banner at the 1991 Super Bowl moved 
as many hearts toward America as have Sousa’s marches. 
Furthermore, some of Chen’s examples of government 
suppression of instrumental music are not a perfect fit for his 
argument that it needs independent protection in the first place. 
In most of the cases of government suppression that he discusses, 
the music was not banned for lacking lyrical content; Nazis did not 
ban instrumental music because it was instrumental, but rather 
because they were anti-Semites and racists who hated its 
composers for being Jewish or Black. The presence or absence of 
lyrical content in the music was irrelevant to the government’s 
efforts to suppress. So too the cases involving school boards’ 
banning of student performances of religious music; there, the 
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schools’ concern was not banning instrumental music, but 
avoiding liability under the Establishment Clause. In the end, 
Chen’s chapter does not so much as supply an independent basis 
for instrumental music’s protection as argue that despite its lack 
of message-conveying lyrical content, instrumental music is 
actually not so different from other forms of expression after all 
(p. 66). That is an important First Amendment-related 
conclusion, and it certainly supplies an adequate rationale for the 
Amendment’s coverage. But if the goal here is to demonstrate 
what is different about instrumental music, then the argument is 
only partially successful. If instrumental music is censored for 
reasons indistinguishable from music more generally, then it is 
hard to see why we need a distinct basis for its First Amendment 
coverage. 
Chen also works through an independent theoretical 
rationale for First Amendment coverage that focuses primarily on 
the music’s cognitive effects on listeners for instrumental music 
(pp. 46-48), and finds these justifications to be mostly incomplete. 
He is right that these theories do not do the trick, but it is for a 
more simple reason than the ones he gives. Listener-based 
theories for protecting nonrepresentational art like instrumental 
music inevitably fail because of their focus on listener effects over 
speaker intent. The best theoretical grounding for protecting 
instrumental music on the same footing as speech, one that I will 
present in more detail in Part II below, rests not with its effects, 
but rather with its creation. Embedded in instrumental music, and 
indeed in all conventionally nonrepresentational art, are artistic 
choices—place the coda here rather than there, run the riff 
through the fuzz pedal or not, or as Chen quotes Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, decide “the right place for the major third” (p. 
23)42—that are themselves covered, on the ground they are no 
different, or no less expressive, than a lyricist’s choice to use the 
sun as a metaphor instead of the moon. 
As Chen says, “instrumental music is a unique way of 
expressing and experiencing culture” (p. 68). But the upshot of his 
essay is actually that with respect to the theory and justifications 
underlying First Amendment coverage, instrumental music is not 
really that unique at all. 
 
 42. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting).  
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B. NONREPRESENTATIONAL ART AS “A GESTURE OF 
LIBERATION, FROM VALUE—POLITICAL, AESTHETIC, 
MORAL”43 
While Chen’s chapter addresses questions about 
instrumental music, Tushnet’s chapter in Free Speech Beyond 
Words explores issues around First Amendment coverage of 
nonrepresentational art. Of the book’s three primary chapters, 
Tushnet asks most directly how to justify the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual 
Group of Boston that Jackson Pollock’s paintings are 
“unquestionably” protected by the First Amendment. And those 
justifications, Tushnet argues, expose several of the 
Amendment’s “unexpected facets” as well (p. 70). 
Those “unexpected facets” include several interesting issues 
such as the tensions between First Amendment coverage 
questions and other doctrines such as copyright and trademark 
law (pp. 109-112) and commercial speech (p. 112). Tushnet’s 
primary contribution, however, is to demonstrate the many ways 
in which governing First Amendment theories fail to justify the 
Amendment’s application to nonrepresentational art. The 
assumed conclusion that all art is covered because it is expressive, 
Tushnet argues, necessarily falters because there are a range of 
other human activities that can be intended to communicate as 
well—many of which no court would assume are covered by the 
Speech Clause (p. 85). Ticket scalping; panhandling; selling 
bootleg T-Shirts at Fenway Park that say “Yankees Suck”44; 
scolding one’s children in public; even political crimes like graffiti 
or assassination—all of these activities can be spun by the people 
engaged in them as both expressive and autonomy-affirming, and 
thus for First Amendment coverage purposes, no different than 
art.45 Additionally, as I discuss in more detail below, 
nonrepresentational art, both on the canvas and via the mission 
statements of many of its practitioners, consistently declares itself 
as directly opposed to the communication of ideas (p. 75). A 
 
 43. This quote is taken from the poet Harold Rosenberg’s essay in ArtNews 
concerning the significance of the Abstract Expressionist movement in American art. 
Harold Rosenberg, The American Action Painters, ARTNEWS (Dec. 1952), 
http://www.artnews.com/2007/11/01/top-ten-artnews-stories-not-a-picture-but-an-event/.  
 44. See Amos Barshad, ‘Yankees Suck! Yankees Suck!’, GRANTLAND (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://grantland.com/features/yankees-suck-t-shirts-boston-red-sox/.  
 45. Since this argument is also a critique of the intent-based approach to First 
Amendment coverage that I propose in Part II of this Essay, I will return to it in Part III. 
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speaker’s “intent to express something” alone thus cannot 
provide the justification for First Amendment coverage of 
nonrepresentational art. 
To address these questions, Tushnet excavates the 
presumption that all of art is covered by the First Amendment, 
and details how that presumption can carry over to art that is not 
intended to convey a particular message. The presumption, 
Tushnet notes, arose for the first time while the Court was 
wrestling with free speech questions concerning, of all things, 
obscenity. In deciding what was obscene in cases such as Miller v. 
California,46 Tushnet notes, the Court “assumed that material that 
can be described as sufficiently artistic cannot be obscene” (p. 
102)—in other words, the Court defined obscenity by what it was 
not, namely, art. Art was covered by the First Amendment, so if 
obscenity was outside the Amendment’s coverage, it could not be 
artistic.47 Accordingly, if the presence or absence of artistic value 
determines whether a particular expression is covered by the First 
Amendment, then the Court is primarily not talking in those cases 
about the freedom of speech, but rather the freedom to make art. 
But who decides what art is? Nonrepresentational art 
presents a difficult puzzle for the project of defining artistic value, 
because it is not intended to represent any one reality, and thus is 
aimed at subjective meaning-making more so than other more 
conventional forms of art. Abstractionists like Pollock abandoned 
representational art’s fidelity to the real appearance of things in 
order to deliberately depart from shared meaning; as the quote 
opening this Section notes, the primary motivating principle for 
much of nonrepresentational art is to free artmaking from the 
constraints of aesthetic value.48 Similarly, critics often describe 
experimental art as not simply removed from a common set of 
 
 46. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 47. See also Sonya G. Bonneau, Ex Post Modernism: How the First Amendment 
Framed Nonrepresentational Art, 39 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 195, 196 (2015) (“[V]isual art’s 
main doctrinal residence stood in obscenity law’s backyard, as a vague definitional 
tautology: art constitutes speech so long as it is not obscene, and speech is not obscene if 
it’s art.”).  
 48. See, e.g., Thomas Girst, (Ab)using Marcel Duchamp: The Concept of the 
Readymade in Post-War and Contemporary American Art, 2 MARCEL DUCHAMP STUD. 
ONLINE J. 5 (2003), http://www.toutfait.com/issues/volume2/issue_5/articles 
/girst2/girst1.html (Marcel Duchamp stating his ready-mades “sought to discourage 
aesthetics”); Jerry Salz, Idol Thoughts, VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 21, 2006), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2006/02/21/idol-thoughts/ (Duchamp’s work “provide[s] a 
way around inflexible either-or aesthetic propositions”).  
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aesthetics, but anti-aesthetic—representing “a position of 
openness, of inquiry, of uncertainty, of discovery.”49 The 
experimental artist’s intent is usually not to communicate an idea 
in the conventional sense, but to facilitate an experience in each 
viewer or listener that is differentiated rather than shared. In 
nonrepresentational art, this mission is usually accomplished 
through the “deliberate abandonment of established forms.”50 
The communicative dynamic intended by the artist/speaker, in 
other words, is one-to-one rather than one-to-many. In contrast 
to most other kinds of expression covered by the First 
Amendment, the whole point of much nonrepresentational art is 
not to impress a particular meaning upon viewers. 
Despite this conflict, however, Tushnet offers a way forward. 
By working through Justice Souter’s opinion in Hurley, Tushnet 
notes that for the First Amendment to cover, the “meaning” that 
observers take from a given expressive act need not be “univocal” 
(p. 104). “The reasonable observer,” he writes, “must understand 
that the object on view is expressive, though not all observers will 
agree on what it expresses” (p. 104). Some viewers must 
understand the expressive act to be intending to say something—
even though there is little shared understanding as to what that 
message precisely is.51 This interpretation, which Chen also 
articulates with respect to instrumental music, takes listener 
autonomy seriously, but it is listener autonomy in its most radical 
form: each individual listener or viewer is entitled to her own 
interpretation of a nonrepresentational work. 
So, in the context of art, not all viewers have to believe a 
particular expression has artistic value in order for the First 
Amendment to cover it. Coverage theory is free from Spence’s 
uniform listener meaning requirement. Some can see Duchamp’s 
Dadaist ready-made Fountain and notice how the curved 
porcelain repeats and refers to the shapes used in representational 
depictions of the female form displayed elsewhere in the 
museum.52 Others will see what one art critic called a severing of 
 
 49. JENNIE GOTTSCHALK, EXPERIMENTAL MUSIC SINCE 1970 1 (2016). 
 50. Id. at 195. 
 51. At least one court of appeals has come to the same conclusion with respect to 
Hurley. See Holloman ex. rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(the test for expressive conduct post-Hurley asks whether a reasonable person would 
interpret conduct as expressing “some sort of message, not whether an observer would 
necessarily infer a specific message.” (emphasis in original)).  
 52. CALVIN TOMPKINS, DUCHAMP: A BIOGRAPHY 186 (1998). 
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“the traditional link between the artist’s labor and the merit of the 
work”53—and perhaps notice, like John Cage hoped his audience 
at Maverick Concert Hall would in 1952, the aesthetic beauty 
displayed throughout everyday industrial life that modernization 
has trained them to ignore. Others will see a urinal turned on its 
back and wonder if a plumber forgot something at his job site. 
Accordingly, the fact that a work of art’s meaning is 
inscrutable or contested is not a barrier to constitutional coverage. 
Tushnet’s argument that First Amendment coverage for 
nonrepresentational art need not rely on a shared aesthetic 
meaning thus shares an elegant symmetry with 
nonrepresentational art itself. But it still carries a thread of the 
very claim that the radical autonomy theorists that birthed 
nonrepresentational art seemed to reject: that art must be 
understood by enough people, or the reasonable (read “right”) 
person, as saying something in order to be covered. We can surely 
conclude now that Duchamp intended to say something with 
Fountain in 1917. But what if no other person at the time saw 
anything other than a urinal? 
The First Amendment definitely covers Fountain now that its 
meaning, or many meanings, to be as precise as Tushnet advocates 
we should be, can be discerned from the work. But was that 
necessarily the case in 1917, when we can’t be so sure that anyone 
saw anything being communicated at all? If nonrepresentational 
art is usually ahead of its time, then is it usually ahead of the First 
Amendment as well?54 It would be odd indeed if the theory 
justifying First Amendment coverage of nonrepresentational art 
provided a weaker justification for coverage at the time the art 
was made, since this would be the point at which the art was most 
in need of protection from government censorship. 
Speaking of censorship, of the three forms of expression 
discussed in Free Speech Beyond Words, Tushnet’s case probably 
presents the most to fear. On the one hand, he is correct to note 
that “[d]irect regulation of artworks as such is rare, and what there 
 
 53. Philip Hensher, The Loo That Shook the World: Duchamp, Man Ray, Picabia, 
THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art
/features/the-loo-that-shook-the-world-duchamp-man-ray-picabi-784384.html.  
 54. Obviously, this problem could also run in the other direction. See Richard A. 
Posner, Art for Law’s Sake, 58 AM. SCHOLAR 513, 514 (1989) (“[A] work highly valued in 
its time, or for that matter in later times, may eventually come to seem thoroughly 
meretricious. Artistic value is something an audience invests a work with, and as the tastes 
of audiences change, so do judgments of artistic value.”).  
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is almost always takes the form of content-neutral regulations that 
readily pass the relevant doctrinal tests” (p. 109). On the other 
hand, governments have shown time and again a willingness to 
impose their standards of what constitutes “good” art, and 
nonrepresentational art usually finds itself across from “good.” 
All of us of a certain age will recall when in 1999, then-New 
York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani threatened to terminate the city’s 
funding for and lease with the Brooklyn Museum of Art for the 
museum’s hosting of the British exhibition Sensation, a show 
which included, among other works, artist Chris Ofili’s painting of 
a black Virgin Mary that incorporated elephant dung.55 To be 
sure, Giuliani’s complaint was primarily due to what he viewed as 
the offensive representational aspect of Ofili’s work, but many of 
the mayor’s comments at the news conference discussing his 
opposition to Sensation leveled charges that could just as easily be 
applied to nonrepresentational works—comments like 
“[a]nything that I can do isn’t art,” and “[i]f I can do it, it’s not art, 
because I’m not much of an artist.”56 Similarly, in the 1930s, the 
New Deal’s Public Works of Art Project subsidized more than 
15,000 paintings, murals, prints, crafts and sculptures, all of which 
depicted what PWAP’s requirements called the “American 
scene,” and nearly none of which were abstract works. Artists on 
the federal payroll were instructed that their works should not 
include anything “experimental [or] unconventional”—evidence 
of an “administrative bias against abstractionist practices in 
American art.”57 During the Second Red Scare, Michigan 
Congressman George Dondero condemned the foreign roots of 
nonrepresentational art, and deemed abstraction as “inherently 
threatening to American values and ideals.”58 Dondero attacked 
 
 55. Abby Goodnough, Giuliani Threatens to Evict Museum Over Art Exhibit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 1999), https://partners.nytimes.com/library/arts/092499brooklyn-
museum.html?mcubz=1. 
 56. Id. See Paul Lieberman and Diane Haithman, N.Y. Art Show Gets Scathing 
Giuliani Review: “Sick Stuff,” L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/
1999/sep/24/news/mn-13513.  
 57. JONATHAN HARRIS, FEDERAL ART AND NATIONAL CULTURE: THE POLITICS 
OF IDENTITY IN NEW DEAL AMERICA 25 (1995); see also FRANCIS V. O’CONNOR, 
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR THE VISUAL ARTS: THE NEW DEAL AND NOW 20 (1969) (PWAP 
standards evinced a “suspicion of anything experimental or controversial”); Jerry Adler, 
1934: The Art of the New Deal, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 2009), http://www.
smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/1934-the-art-of-the-new-deal-132242698/ (describing 
“conservative” nature of PWAP-funded projects).  
 58. Bonneau, supra note 47, at 203–04 (citing William Hauptman, The Suppression 
of art in the McCarthy Decade, ARTFORUM,Oct. 1973, at 48). 
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nonrepresentational art from the floor of Congress, claiming that 
“[c]ubism aims to destroy by designed disorder . . . Dadaism aims 
to destroy by ridicule . . . [a]bstraction aims to destroy by the 
creation of brainstorms . . . [and] [s]urrealism aims to destroy by 
the denial of reason.”59 And though Tushnet focuses more on the 
conduct of domestic governments than Chen, there are 
international examples here as well; Fascists and Stalinists 
criticized nonrepresentational art as dangerously opposed to mass 
culture.60 Unlike Chen’s examples, most of which involve 
government censorship of music for reasons largely incidental to 
the music’s lack of lyrics, the nonrepresentational nature of the 
art being attacked here is the very reason for governmental 
scrutiny and scorn. So, the need for a freestanding theory 
justifying First Amendment coverage for nonrepresentational art 
is genuine, and Tushnet does essential work in providing one. 
C. “ALL MIMSY WERE THE BOROGOVES”61: SENSE IN THE 
NONSENSE 
Finally, in a chapter by Joseph Blocher, Free Speech Beyond 
Words considers the First Amendment coverage question through 
the lens of nonsense speech. Of the three authors, Blocher has 
given himself by far the hardest swath to mow. Scholars and the 
Court have often tied First Amendment coverage to the presence 
or absence of meaning (p. 114); nonsense, based on this framing, 
is meaning’s opposite. Blocher uses nonsense as a tool to cast 
considerable doubt on the reflexive notion that “meaning is a 
prerequisite for constitutional coverage” (p. 115). In particular, he 
shows the damage it would do to the First Amendment if that 
notion were correct. Examining nonsense from a theoretical 
perspective demonstrates that meaning does not, and indeed 
cannot, carry the constitutional weight that many commentators 
and judges have assumed it does. 
Blocher begins by distinguishing among types of nonsense, 
since the rationales for First Amendment coverage might vary 
depending on the particular kind of nonsense at issue. First, there 
 
 59. 95 Cong. Rec. 11, 584–85 (1949) (Rep. Dondero delivering a speech entitled 
Modern Art Shackled to Communism). 
 60. See Bonneau, supra note 47, at 202 (citing CLEMENT GREENBERG, AVANT-
GARDE AND KITSCH (1939), reprinted in CLEMENT GREENBERG, ART AND CULTURE: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS 3, 19 (1961)). 
 61. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND 
THERE 21 (1872). 
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is what Blocher calls “overt nonsense,” namely, the “intentional 
and apparent” use of words that, individually or in combination, 
“lack[] meaning” (pp. 120-121), or the Jabberwockys or William 
Burroughs-inspired cut-up poems of the world.62 This labeling is 
consistent with critical commentaries on nonsense literature, 
which understand “nonsense as a deliberate strategy”63—or, to 
use the terminology of this Review, the use of nonsense as a 
deliberate communicative choice to favor rhyme, tonality, 
alliteration, rhythm, or other kinds of acoustics-based wordplay 
over linguistic-based semantic meaning. There is also “covert 
nonsense” (p. 121)—those expressive acts where a speaker 
intends meaning, but the meaning is not received, or if a meaning 
is received, it is not the one the speaker intended. And though 
Blocher does not focus on this problem, failing to lock down First 
Amendment coverage for nonsense is problematic because it is a 
very short step from Jabberwocky’s overt nonsense to uses of 
words that sound or read more like speech, but nevertheless make 
no sense. One need not leaf through a compilation of obscure 
online experimental flarf poetry to appreciate this point.64 Here is 
a sample of the lyrics from I Am Trying to Break Your Heart, the 
opening song from the band Wilco’s Yankee Hotel Foxtrot, one of 
the most critically acclaimed rock albums of the 2000s. You tell 
me what they mean. 
I want to hold you in the Bible-black predawn 
You’re quite a quiet domino, bury me now 
Take off your Band-Aid because I don’t believe in touchdowns 
What was I thinking when I said hello?65 
 
 62.  Burroughs described the cut-up method as follows: 
Take a page. Like this page. Now cut down the middle and cross the middle. You 
have four sections: 1 2 3 4. Now rearrange the sections placing section four with 
section one and section two with section three. And you have a new page. 
Sometimes it says much the same thing. Sometimes something quite different . . . . 
William Burroughs, The Cut Up Method, in THE MODERNS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF NEW 
WRITING IN AMERICA 345, 345–48 (LeRoi Jones, ed. 1963).  
 63. RICHARD ELLIOTT, THE SOUND OF NONSENSE 8 (2018). 
 64. Flarf poetry’s primary aesthetic is, in the words of its practitioners, “deliberate 
shapelessness of content, form, spelling, and thought in general, with liberal borrowing 
from internet chat-room drivel and spam scripts . . . .” The Flarf Files, http://writing.upenn.
edu/epc/authors/bernstein/syllabi/readings/flarf.html (last visited June 12, 2018).  
 65. WILCO, I Am Trying to Break Your Heart, on YANKEE HOTEL FOXTROT (self-
released 2001; Nonesuch Records 2002). One might argue that the expressive content of 
lyrics like these, like those of Jabberwocky, is rhythmic rather than literal meaning.  
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In a doctrinal world where First Amendment rules and 
theory are meaning-dependent, coverage of nonsense—even 
speech that is intended to have meaning but winds up being 
nonsense for the reasons Blocher describes—is at risk. However, 
as he notes, there is little debate that coverage does indeed reach 
nonsense of all kinds, or more specifically that stream-of-
consciousness composition, automatic writing, and surrealist 
literature are “speech” for First Amendment purposes. To resolve 
this inconsistency, Blocher turns away from law and towards 
analytic philosophy—particularly its rejection, primarily via the 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the late 1940s and early 1950s, of 
the concept of “representational meaning” (pp. 116-117). 
By representational meaning, philosophers meant that 
language only had meaning when it connected to “extralinguistic 
concepts” (p. 133)—namely, in the words of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, “the facts for which they stand” (p. 134).66 In other 
words, as Wittgenstein argued, “the limits of my language mean 
the limits of my world” (p. 136)67: because the existence of reality 
depended on the use of language to describe it, language that did 
not describe reality had no meaning. But in much the same way as 
nonrepresentational artists began seeing artmaking as its own end 
rather than as simply a means to make references to things that 
previously existed in the visual world, the analytic thinkers began 
to see the defects and limitations in representational meaning, and 
adopted a different approach: language’s meaning depended not 
on its “representation of the world,” but rather on its use— 
“whether or not” the speakers have “followed the rules” of what 
Wittgenstein called “the relevant language game” in which the 
speakers are communicating (p. 140). If the speakers’ use is 
following the applicable socially understood rules of the 
applicable language game, then their use of language will be 
processed and understood by their co-party or co-parties in the 
 
 66. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. 
REV. 443, 460 (1899); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May 
9, 1925), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 
AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1935, 737, 738 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harv. U. Press 
1953) (noting how difficult it is to “think accurately—and think things not words”). 
 67. Ludwig Wittgenstein, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS §5.6, at 149 (C. K. 
Ogden ed. & trans., Harcourt Brace 1922) (emphasis omitted); see id. §3.032, at 43, 45 (“To 
present in language anything which ‘contradicts logic’ is as impossible as in geometry to 
present by its co-ordinates a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the co-
ordinates of a point which does not exist.”).  
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communicative act. On the other hand, if the speakers’ use does 
not follow those rules, the use results in nonsense. My uses of the 
terms “NAFTA,” “Obamacare,” or “LBGTQIA” follow the rules 
of the game of “faculty lounge language,” and thus have meaning, 
but under the rules of the game of “father-young daughter 
language,” my uses would produce nonsense.68 
This shift is instructive for law, Blocher claims, because 
current First Amendment doctrine relies upon representational 
meaning-based analysis in several foundational respects. 
Whenever a speaker, scholar, or court argues that acts are covered 
by the First Amendment if they “convey[] ‘ideas’ or 
‘information’” (p. 137),69 they are falling into the same trap that 
the analytic theorists worked through when they abandoned 
representational meaning in favor of a focus on language’s use. 
Spence v. Washington, with its dual requirements that a speaker 
“inten[ded] to convey a particular[] message” and there existed a 
great “likelihood . . . that the message would be understood by 
those who view[] it” in order for the First Amendment to apply, 
is the apex of the representational meaning approach (p. 138).70 
But by tying coverage to representation-based meaning, 
nonsense, some forms of symbolic speech, and a range of other 
expressive activity are by implication left outside the First 
Amendment altogether. 
In defending his premise that the First Amendment must 
cover nonsense, Blocher is not as quick to question listener-based 
First Amendment values as are Chen and Tushnet. Protecting 
nonsense is consistent with marketplace theory, Blocher argues, 
because “if the marketplace model requires judges to be agnostic 
as to truthfulness, it seems they should also be agnostic as to 
meaningfulness” (p. 125). On first glance, this reads like 
autonomy theory wrapped in a marketplace-of-ideas blanket. If 
the marketplace of ideas model protects nonsense because the 
function of the market is not to facilitate the search for objective 
 
 68.  The rules of this language game certainly depend on the age of the daughter 
(mine is 8), as well as other contexts that Wittgenstein would deem as relevant to rule-
setting.  
 69. John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1347–48 (2008).  
 70. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974); see R. George Wright, What 
Counts as “Speech” in the First Place? Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 
PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1238 (2010) (“In the absence of the speaker’s intent to promote some 
more or less determinate understanding, we may be skeptical that speech in the 
constitutional sense is present.”).  
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fact but rather solely what John Stuart Mill called “the likings and 
dislikings”71 of individual reason and judgment, then there isn’t 
much if any daylight between the collective search for truth and 
the individual search for self-fulfillment through expressive 
liberty. But Blocher is absolutely correct to argue that the 
argument over whether nonsense in fact has value, expressive or 
otherwise, is a form of searching for truth (p. 126), in much the 
same way as Tushnet shows that arguing over what Duchamp 
meant by the Fountain is evidence that the thing being argued 
over itself has First Amendment value. This argument, however, 
has its own limitations. 
Nonsense, or at least what Blocher calls overt nonsense, is 
usually an explicit rejection of the premise that words have a 
communally agreed upon meaning. As Hugo Ball wrote in the 
Dadaist Manifesto excerpted above for the epigram to this 
Review, “words are other people’s inventions . . . I want my own 
stuff.”72 It is certainly so that many have used the Manifesto, or 
Carroll’s Jabberwocky, or Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, a work that Blocher describes as proudly 
“proclaim[ing] itself to be nonsensical” (p. 126), in their own 
explorations of what truth is, or what it can be. But to return to an 
argument made above in response to some of Tushnet’s claims, 
what about the overt nonsense that no one argues about at all? 
Claims that First Amendment coverage attaches to nonsense 
because “meaningless speech . . . can have value as a means to 
truth” (p. 127), standing alone, is a version of the “art is important 
if it has aesthetic value” that nonrepresentational artists and 
nonsense writers expressly rejected. 
This value-based argument is what Chen in the context of 
instrumental music calls an “associative claim.” It attaches First 
Amendment coverage not to the expressive act itself, but rather 
to the “association” of that act with “particular events or historical 
contexts” (p. 34)—here, the debates over those acts, the contexts 
in which they were made, and the degree to which they contribute 
to later debates. Blocher has to be arguing that the First 
Amendment covers useless as well as useful nonsense, on the 
ground that usefulness might one day blossom where once there 
was only uselessness. Because he can’t be arguing that the case for 
 
 71. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (1859). 
 72. Ball, supra note 5.  
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First Amendment coverage exists only when nonsense is useful. 
Most nonsense is useless, and proudly so. 
Additionally, Tushnet’s “mutivocal” coverage solution 
described above seems to be at least partially responsive to 
Blocher’s covert nonsense problem. Under a multivocality theory, 
First Amendment coverage will attach if some listeners ascribe 
some meaning, or more broadly some intent to make meaning, to 
the speaker’s communicative act. Accordingly, looking for 
meaning per se in determining the existence or absence of First 
Amendment coverage does not rely on any common 
understanding on what that meaning might be. And Tushnet does 
not need analytic philosophy to reach this conclusion. Indeed 
Blocher, like Tushnet, points to Hurley as a “rejection of the 
representational approach and an endorsement of the idea that 
meaning lies in form and use” (p. 142). 
Blocher argues that, in effect, the Speech Clause covers an 
individual’s right as to whether to make sense or not. The First 
Amendment’s primary concern is not with what we eventually 
say, but rather in the decisions that precede the communicative 
act. Which brings us back to John Cage. 
II. NON-SPEECH AS THE CHOICE NOT TO SPEAK 
It is no coincidence that Tushnet and Chen, and to a lesser 
extent Blocher, all independently come to the conclusion that the 
collective value-based theories underlying the First Amendment 
are mostly inadequate for explaining why the Amendment covers 
instrumental music, nonrepresentational art, and nonsense 
writing. The making of art is an individualistic act that manifests 
the author’s expressive choices, and thus any theory whose 
justifications are essentially collective in nature, or depend on 
others’ identifying or interpreting those choices, will not suffice. 
Collective theories concern themselves primarily with the 
exchange of ideas between the speaker and the audience; 
however, First Amendment coverage cannot depend on an 
audience’s interpretation of the artist’s communication, since as 
Tushnet, Chen and Blocher show, the meaning-making of the 
audience is often independent of the meaning (or lack of 
meaning) that the artist intended. We are all deconstructivist free 
speech libertarians now. 
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In Part II.A below, I argue that the First Amendment covers 
an individual’s decision as to whether or not to speak, whether 
through non-use of words or via inaction. If this is true, then the 
Amendment necessarily also covers one’s right to express oneself 
without words. Part II.B discusses another area of constitutional 
law, namely the Fifth Amendment, where the connection between 
autonomy and silence is better theorized. Later, in Part III, I 
attempt to draw some limiting principles around these arguments. 
A. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS-BASED DECISIONAL AUTONOMY 
AND FREE SPEECH 
At its core, underlying the First Amendment’s coverage of 
expressive acts such as nonrepresentational art and instrumental 
music is a theory that resonates more with current substantive due 
process doctrine than that of free speech. Governing much of the 
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is an 
understanding of the liberty component of the Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause that protects the individual’s decision-making 
authority on issues critical to that individual’s self-conception and 
actualization—decisions on issues that are so fundamentally 
personal in nature that the Court has long said the government’s 
lawmaking authority cannot reach them. 
Furthermore, and critically for present purposes, the Court’s 
fundamental rights jurisprudence under the Fourteenth 
Amendment recognizes that the sub-rights around that decisional 
core, such as the right to decide to conceive a child or to marry, 
for example, also include the inverse sides of those same rights: 
the decision not to conceive, or not to marry.73 This view of 
fundamental-rights-protection-as-decisional-rights-protection 
recognizes that the Constitution necessarily protects inaction to 
the same degree as action, as both are expressions of autonomy 
and free will. A law that obliges married couples to use 
contraception, for example, is just as constitutionally defective as 
one that bars them from doing so, and for the same reasons. 
 
 73.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“[T]hese liberties 
extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including 
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”); Bowers 478 U.S. at 191 
(explaining that previous cases “were interpreted as construing the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental individual right to decide whether or 
not to beget or bear a child” (emphasis added)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(“[T]he freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.” (emphasis added)).  
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The First Amendment’s coverage is similarly multi-sided. 
Even though the First Amendment expressly applies to the 
freedom of speech, its coverage and protection must necessarily 
apply to “non-speech”—acts that because of a deliberate choice 
by the speaker do not use words, but nevertheless are intended to 
communicate a message. It must cover both the decision to use a 
particular set of words and the decision to not use words, 
including the decision to be silent. It follows that the use of words 
or not as a proxy for the presence or absence of expressiveness is 
a red herring, because the decision to not use words is itself an 
expressive act covered by the First Amendment. 
To be sure, cases like West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette affirm that the Speech Clause protects one’s right not 
to speak a government message, there the right to not recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance, if one’s conscience so compels.74 Twenty-
five years later, in Wooley v. Maynard, the Court declared that 
the right of freedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment against state action includes both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. . . . The 
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 
complementary components of the broader concept of 
“individual freedom of mind.”75 
Likewise, Hurley itself, to which both Tushnet and Blocher 
give extended attention, is fundamentally a right not to speak 
case. There, parade organizers did not want to include the gay and 
lesbian Irish-American group that sought to participate in the 
parade, because the organizers believed that forcing them to do 
so would force them to express approval of that group’s message.76 
The right to non-speech relates to the right to be free from 
articulating the government’s message, as recognized in Barnette 
and Wooley, but it is not coextensive with that right. Where the 
choice to be silent has a distinct expressive value, the interest 
being protected is not simply the conscience-related right to speak 
one’s own mind or not in lieu of another’s specific message. An 
example of the First Amendment covering one’s right not to 
speak would be presented by Louis Michael Seidman’s proposal 
of a hypothetical law mandating that Americans cast votes on 
 
 74. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
 75.  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).  
 76.  See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 574 
(1995). 
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Election Day.77 The right implicated here is slightly different from 
that described in Barnette, Wooley, and Hurley, where the rights 
at issue were to be free from government “restrict[ing] or 
modify[ing] the message” a speaker “wishes to express,” “bear an 
offensive statement personally,” or “affirm a [specific] moral or 
political commitment.”78 Even though the government’s 
compulsory voting law is not telling the individual for whom to 
vote, there is no doubt that the First Amendment would cover an 
individual’s decision to not comply with the statute’s mandate. 
Through its power of coercion, the state is in effect trying to force 
the individual to speak where she prefers to remain silent. And 
this silence has expressive content, particularly with respect to the 
social context of nonvoting as a commonly understood example 
of protest through inaction. A similar infringement of a right to 
not speak would be presented by a hypothetical public financing 
system that directed a small portion of taxpayers’ payments to go 
toward presidential candidates’ campaigns. There, the speaker is 
being forced to communicate a message, by way of a political 
contribution, that the First Amendment protects the speaker’s 
right to decide not to make.79 
Even though “withdrawing in disgust is not the same as 
apathy,” both sentiments, though opposites, are often expressed 
in the same way—namely by not speaking at all.80 And the First 
Amendment has long been recognized to cover anonymity, or the 
right “not to reveal one’s identity when exercising one’s 
affirmative right to express oneself”; as Martin Redish writes, 
anonymity is a “traditionally recognized subcategory of the 
constitutional guarantee of silence.”81 Like silence, anonymity, 
 
 77. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, SILENCE AND FREEDOM 9 (2007). 
 78. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 (2000) 
(Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (describing rights at issue in Hurley, Wooley, and 
Barnette respectively).  
 79. Cf. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (forced contribution of a 
portion of dues to political candidates violates dues-payers’ rights to freedom of 
association); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).  
 80.  SLACKER (Detour Filmproduction 1991). 
 81.  Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression, Political Fraud, and the Dilemma of 
Anonymity, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN LAW 143 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010); see 
also id. at 149 (“[I]n an important sense, anonymity is a subcategory of a right not to speak: 
the choice not to reveal one’s name is a narrower exercise of a broader right to choose to 
not speak at all, because it represents the decision of the speaker to selectively limit his 
expression.”).  
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“as part of the suite of editorial decisions about what to include 
or exclude . . . is itself a speech act.”82 
Assuming this is all correct, it is a short step to go from 
finding that the First Amendment covers “non-speech” to finding 
it also covers nonverbal or nonrepresentational expressive acts 
like those discussed in Free Speech Beyond Words. Inaction, or 
non-speech, is one outcome of autonomy’s exercise, but so too are 
other expressive choices. The Amendment covers David Levine’s 
decision to draw a caricature of Henry Kissinger having sex with 
a woman with a head shaped like the Earth’s globe and call it 
“Screwing the World,”83 but it also protects Jackson Pollock’s 
decision not to paint a similar portrait, and to splatter paint 
instead. If the First Amendment protects Woody Guthrie’s 
decision to join lyrics to music in the service of social justice, it 
must also protect John Cage’s decision to express himself through 
4’33”’s deliberate absence of sound. A right that covers how one 
speaks must also cover whether one speaks at all. 
However—and consistent with many, but not all of the 
arguments made in Free Speech Beyond Words—the presence or 
absence of First Amendment coverage for a particular speech act 
cannot turn on whether the decision to speak or not has 
communicative content as assessed by someone other than the 
speaker. As discussed above, it is easy to imagine acts intended to 
be expressive that no reasonable observer would understand to be 
even communicative, let alone to express a “particularized 
message,” per Spence. Including listener understanding as part of 
the calculus for First Amendment coverage purposes cuts against 
the commitment to expressive autonomy, as illustrated in cases 
where the expression in question does not use words to convey 
meaning. 
Other constitutional contexts have better explored the 
theoretical connection between autonomy and silence. Next, I will 
briefly touch on one such context and see what we can learn from 
it. 
 
 
 82. Paul Horwitz, Comment on Chapter 4: Anonymity, Signaling, and Silence as 
Speech, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN LAW 181 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).  
 83.  See David Levine, Screwing the World (1984), ILLUSTRATION CHRONICLES, 
http://illustrationchronicles.com/Screwing-the-World-with-David-Levine (last visited June 
13, 2018). 
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B. THE AUTONOMY-BASED RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
Another area of constitutional law in which the connection 
between silence and autonomy is more fully theorized is in the 
Fifth Amendment context, in particular the post-Miranda v. 
Arizona development of the right against self-incrimination. 
Miranda itself relied on the proposition that an individual 
possesses a right to remain silent “unless he chooses to speak in 
the unfettered exercise of his own will,” and as Lisa Kern Griffin 
notes, Miranda “references the concept of free choice nine 
times.”84 Griffin argues that “misperceptions about what silence 
communicates” prejudice criminal defendants, and that silence 
does not indicate that the speaker has nothing to say, but rather 
“indicates the need for a space within which to make choices,” 
protects the “freedom to choose what to say to whom and when 
to say it,” and “leaves room for individuals to form their own 
plans.”85 Similarly, the aforementioned work of Louis Michael 
Seidman notes that because silence is the predicate for speech, 
silence must be protected “in order to give meaning to speech . . . 
. [F]or speech to be truly free, there must also be silence.”86 
Silence and choice, in other words, are inextricable. In the 
view of these and other criminal justice scholars, in the Fifth 
Amendment context, focusing on the observer’s interpretation of 
the expressive content of silence or lack thereof is not part of the 
analysis; it is part of the problem. The expressive value of silence, 
as well as other forms of “non-speech,” cannot be left to the ear 
or the eye of the beholder. Indeed, doing so can be, and often is, 
prejudicial to the speaker who has chosen to express herself 
through silence rather than words. 
There is much that First Amendment theorists can learn from 
this approach. At first glance, the stakes with respect to the First 
and Fifth Amendments are very different. The risks around self-
incrimination relate to “what the state does to criminals . . . . 
[W]hen a person incriminates herself, the state puts her in prison, 
or perhaps even takes her life.”87 However, determining whether 
 
 84.  Lisa Kern Griffin, Silence, Confessions, and the New Accuracy Imperative, 65 
DUKE L.J. 697, 704–05 (2016). 
 85. Id. at 698, 704–05 (second quote quoting Austin Sarat, Introduction: Situating 
Speech and Silence, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN LAW 1, 3 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2010) (quotation marks omitted)).  
 86. SEIDMAN, supra note 77, at 2. 
 87.  Id. at 169.  
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the First Amendment covers a particular act can certainly decide 
whether one’s liberty is at risk. Gregory Lee Johnson, the 
petitioner in Texas v. Johnson,88 was initially sentenced to a year’s 
incarceration for burning an American flag outside of Dallas’ City 
Hall. When the Court was assessing whether or not Johnson’s 
conduct was covered by the First Amendment, they were literally 
deciding whether or not he would go to prison. Despite its citing 
of the Spence test, the Court’s focus was accordingly on Johnson’s 
intent to communicate and the “context in which [his conduct] 
occurred.”89 To be sure, the Court also noted that the “overtly 
political nature” of Johnson’s act was “overwhelmingly 
apparent.”90 But First Amendment coverage could not rise or fall 
on Johnson’s audience’s understanding of his message—or 
whether they understood it to be a message at all. 
III. A SEARCH FOR LIMITING PRINCIPLES 
It is simple to state, as the Supreme Court has, that free 
speech “means more than simply the right to talk and to write.”91 
But finding the border between expressive and nonexpressive 
conduct has been a much more difficult task. That difficulty is 
compounded by, among other things, the standard approach to 
current First Amendment problems, which is discussed in more 
detail in this Part. 
A. THE SPECTER OF FIRST AMENDMENT EXPANSIONISM 
The arguments such as those made in Free Speech Beyond 
Words and in this Review defending the Speech Clause’s coverage 
of nominally non-expressive acts must be viewed within a broader 
First Amendment context. That context is one where 
interpretations of the Amendment’s applicability and protections 
nearly always expand rather than contract. As Tushnet notes in 
an earlier article, First Amendment scholars, at least historically, 
have long been collectively biased in favor of First Amendment 
expansionism. He writes: 
Scholars of the First Amendment seem to “like” the 
Amendment [in a way that scholars of other constitutional 
 
 88. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989).  
 89.  Id. at 405.  
 90.  Id. at 406. 
 91.  City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).  
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topics do not “like” the Amendments that are the topic of their 
study]. . . . What I mean by “liking” the First Amendment is 
something like this: A First Amendment scholar hears that a 
court has held that some local ordinance or state statute 
violates the First Amendment, and his or her initial thought is 
that the decision is presumptively correct.92 
This bias, Tushnet claims, works as a one-way ratchet with 
respect to First Amendment scholarship’s, and, by extension, 
lawyers’ and judges’, views as to the Amendment’s reach. 
Individual arguments concerning the legality, or even the 
normative merits, of particular regulations that might be argued 
to infringe upon speech run up against the unified presumption 
that most if not all expressive acts are covered by the First 
Amendment, and that those acts enjoy maximum protection. This 
is a systemic problem, Tushnet claims. It leads to a faux balancing 
where the government’s regulatory interest always loses, or as 
Justice Scalia might have said, the dice are always loaded in favor 
of free speech.93 
Most interestingly, Tushnet also argues that even though 
many (most?) of those same scholars believe that the Roberts 
Court’s expansion of the First Amendment has taken a wrong 
turn in areas such as campaign finance and commercial speech, 
the reasons the scholars give are based not on the competing 
considerations and counter-majoritarian difficulties wrestled with 
across other areas of constitutional law, but rather on the 
Amendment itself. Citizens United v. FEC and McCutcheon v. 
FEC are wrong not because the Court showed insufficient 
Thayerian deference to elected officials in a core area of 
legislative expertise, but rather because the Court ignored the free 
speech rights of “less wealthy and powerful speakers” to favor the 
rights of “wealthy donors” and “business corporations.”94 Even 
cases expanding the First Amendment are attacked as wrong on 
 
 92. Mark Tushnet, Introduction: Reflections on the First Amendment and the 
Information Economy, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2234, 2237 (2014).  
 93.  U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (accusing the Court of “load[ing] the 
dice” in constitutional cases in order to reach its desired result). 
 94. GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST 
AMENDMENT 157–58 (2017); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Tushnet here is 
noting the absence of Thayerian approaches in First Amendment scholarship that pervade 
other areas of constitutional law—namely, the idea that judges should only strike down a 
law when its unconstitutionality “is so clear that it is not open to rational question.” 
Tushnet, supra note 92, at 2244 (quoting Thayer, supra, at 144). 
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expansionist grounds. The scholarly debate is not about whether 
judges are over-steering at the First Amendment wheel, but 
rather about the direction of the resulting drift. 
This trend could fuel the implicit discomfort that some 
readers might have with respect to the consequences of Chen, 
Tushnet, and Blocher’s conclusions. If the freedom of speech does 
not depend on the use of literal speech, and the judiciary and 
academy both bring heavy priors to First Amendment questions 
in favor of both coverage and protection, then governmental 
interests in a range of cases will be deprived a fair hearing. It also 
makes finding limiting principles in First Amendment coverage 
even more pressing. Below, I first point out a few of the questions 
that a choice-based coverage theory immediately raises, and then 
attempt to offer a few such principles. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH A CHOICE-BASED FIRST AMENDMENT 
THEORY 
If the First Amendment protects one’s decision not to speak, 
then why would it not protect other failures to act that were for 
expressive reasons? Would one’s failure to file federal income 
taxes now be protected by the Speech Clause, if the reason for 
doing so was to conscientiously object to the military effort 
funded by those taxes? What about a refusal to report to jury duty 
as an expression of disbelief in the criminal justice system, or a 
host of other choices to not act that could be ascribed expressive 
content by those making them? To use one of Tushnet’s examples 
from the book, one could easily envision small businessmen 
claiming that their decision to run businesses of a certain kind is 
intended to communicate a message about income inequality and 
corporate power (p. 72). (If you don’t believe this is plausible, ask 
the couple selling raw milk at your local farmer’s market what 
they think about the milk at your town or city’s largest grocery 
store.) Similarly, Blocher argues that “[t]he expansiveness of the 
autonomy conception leaves its defenders with a vast territory to 
patrol, because nearly any act can be described as a manifestation 
of individual autonomy” (p. 128). 
In addition, a fully realized, autonomy-based rationale for 
putting non-speech on equal footing with speech for First 
Amendment coverage purposes could potentially do significant 
damage to the regulatory state, particularly with respect to 
compelled disclosures. If a meatpacker is protected from 
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government interferences by its right not to speak, then FDA-
imposed labeling requirements might violate the First 
Amendment. As Jed Rubenfeld wrote more than fifteen years 
ago, “[p]eople constantly want to violate laws for expressive 
reasons.”95 
In a related argument, Tushnet also warns us about rationales 
for First Amendment coverage that rely too much on speaker 
intent, claiming them to be “both over- and under-inclusive” (p. 
83).96 With respect to overinclusivity, all manner of nonartistic 
activities are often intended to express some point, from the street 
scalper striking his own tiny blow against Ticketmaster to the 
leather-jacket-wearing loiterer on the street corner hoping to 
convey his coolness. If First Amendment coverage is triggered by 
intent to express, then it must follow that it covers all manner of 
conduct that no reasonable person would put on equal footing 
with speech, which seems wrong. And with respect to 
underinclusiveness, he argues that many artists do not intend to 
express any particular message at all; the “intent” behind much of 
art, especially nonrepresentational art, is to explore the 
relationship between shape and form, or following Cage and 
Rauschenberg, to cause the viewer or listener to refocus their 
attention in a new way, or simply to make something that has 
never been made before. However, there is little question that 
such works are covered. An intent-based rationale is thus 
underinclusive if it would fail to provide a basis for covering those 
acts, even those that adhere to artistic genres, which are not 
intended to express anything at all. This too seems wrong. Hence 
the problem with intent as the driving force for deciding coverage 
questions. 
C. SETTING AUTONOMY’S LIMITS 
Both the authors of Free Speech Beyond Words and I argue 
that the tools for First Amendment coverage questions need 
further development so that in some cases First Amendment 
protection questions can be avoided entirely. If that is so, what 
might constitute what we could call a “First Amendment Step 1” 
 
 95. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 
(2001).  
 96. Other scholars have leveled similar critiques at autonomy-based rationales. See, 
e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 
(1989). 
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case, where a court would find coverage over a particular act or 
inaction is not present, and thus there is no protection question to 
which to proceed?97 If a coverage rule or theory is too vague or 
too capacious, we wind up at exactly the point at which we began, 
and which motivated Chen, Tushnet, and Blocher to write their 
book—assume coverage exists, then let protection doctrine do all 
the work. But there are some tools with which to solve this puzzle, 
some of which are already a part of First Amendment doctrine, 
and some of which flow from taking choice seriously as a 
justification for First Amendment coverage. 
First, with respect to underinclusivity, a commitment to and 
thoughtful application of choice-based coverage theory can 
resolve most concerns. First Amendment coverage for art lacking 
intent to convey a particularized message may run contrary to the 
dictates of Spence v. Washington, but it fits comfortably within a 
choice-based coverage rationale. As I have stated, the basis for 
First Amendment coverage is that the Amendment, like the 
liberty component of the Due Process Clause, applies to 
expressive choices, not the outputs of those choices. If output is 
not outcome-determinative with respect to coverage, then the 
listener’s role in the coverage inquiry recedes, and the question 
whether a message would have been understood by its audience 
is not dispositive. The decision to make art or not, and the lesser 
included decision to make art that represents real life vs. art that 
is a technical experiment in form of the type Tushnet describes, is 
necessarily covered. And the reasons for the government’s 
infringement on speakers’ exercise of their right to decide 
whether and how to speak can also bear on coverage questions—
an inquiry that can apply not just to compelled speech contexts, 
but to others. For example, a mandate that “no one shall make 
nonrepresentational art” when the government has deemed such 
art to be contrary to American ideals presents a clear ground for 
constitutional coverage for noncompliance. 
 
 97. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Recent scholarly 
work has sought to shed more light on the coverage question. See, e.g., Morgan Weiland, 
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech 
Tradition, 9 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1457–58 (2017) (arguing that coverage questions should 
focus on whether the speaker autonomy sought to be protected is “thick,” meaning 
individually held and consonant with other First Amendment interests, such as self-
governance or self-realization, or “thin,” meaning assertion of a bare speech right by 
corporate speakers or other non-natural legal persons).  
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At the same time, however, it cannot be the case that every 
silence is presumed covered ipso facto because silence is one 
necessary condition for making expressive choices. Inaction is an 
actualization of liberty, but there is not pure symmetry between 
action and inaction for constitutional purposes outside the context 
of the Due Process Clause; there, inaction is protected only in 
relation to the right at issue.98 Forced sterilization by the 
government violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty 
component, but so does forced procreation.99 So too with the Fifth 
Amendment; the relevant inaction there is in the context of 
declining to respond to interrogation in the interest of avoiding 
self-incrimination.100 In both domains, government compulsion or 
proscription through what Seana Shiffrin terms “legal 
materials”101—“laws, regulations, court rulings, and 
resolutions”102—is what provides the basis for finding that a 
symmetry between action and inaction exists. 
There is also something different about these rights that 
compels the conclusion that their protections are symmetrical—
that they extend to both action and inaction around that right. 
Blocher writes in another article that “[a] choice right is a right to 
do both X and not-X, where not-X means refusing to do or accept 
X.”103 A particular right is deemed a “choice right” in “light of the 
purposes” the relevant amendment is “meant to serve”104—and if 
those purposes point to protecting choice, then the symmetry 
manifests through the proscription of both government 
prohibition (restraining one from doing X) and coercion (forcing 
one to do X). In other words, certain rights are “bilateral”—with 
respect to such a right, “the freedom to do x entails the freedom 
 
 98. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 99.  Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The question may not be as simple as 
this purely symmetrical approach would conclude. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution 
and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140–42 (2008) (proposing a three-
part framework of legal, gestational, and genetic parenthood and arguing the “right to not 
procreate” would operate differently depending on which of those three contexts applied). 
For present purposes, I refer to the most general hypothetical form of forced procreation: 
a law mandating that parents have children, or what Cohen calls gestational parenthood, 
which proscribes the decision, to use the Court’s words in Eisenstadt v. Baird, “whether or 
not to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 100. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
 101. Seana Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 283, 287 (2011). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 765 (2012).  
 104. Id. at 766–67. 
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to not do x.”105 This is not the same, however, as a “generalized 
right against coercion.”106 
The right to freedom of speech is a quintessential choice 
right. Its primary purpose is to serve not just the expression of 
one’s views, but also the formation of the views one may decide 
to express. It protects freedom of mind and thought, not simply 
freedom of speech.107 Those interests require bilateral protection. 
Accordingly, the First Amendment is implicated whenever legal 
materials interfere with expressive choice, including when the 
choice is not to speak. 
Of course, this conclusion likely proves to some that speaker 
intent-based coverage rationales are necessarily over-inclusive, a 
charge made by both Tushnet and Blocher.108 It is certainly true 
that all kinds of conduct can be undertaken with the intent to 
communicate a message. If intent to communicate is the trigger 
for First Amendment coverage, conduct that has long been 
thought outside of the Speech Clause’s reach brings the First 
Amendment into the picture, requiring what Tushnet calls “at 
least a tiny increment[al increase] in the justification for 
regulation” (p. 85) in a range of areas. And if, as I have advocated, 
the coverage question is rooted in and informed by the liberty to 
choose to decide what to say, including whether to speak or not, 
then, to use Blocher’s phrase, the territory that autonomy 
defenders must patrol may have expanded even more. In other 
words, my proposed solution to the underinclusivity problem 
compounds the overinclusivity problem. 
However, making “the choice of the speech by the self the 
crucial factor in justifying” constitutional coverage does not 
necessarily enable a freestanding First Amendment defense to 
safety regulations, criminal conspiracy, or antidiscrimination 
law.109 By asking whether a particular act was primarily intended 
as communicative, we can keep most of the corpus of criminal law, 
 
 105. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 17 (1996). 
 106. Joseph Blocher, The Right to Not Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 54 n.15 
(2012). 
 107. See Schiffrin, supra note 101, at 283 (“[w]e should understand freedom of speech 
as, centrally, protecting freedom of thought”); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (free speech serves the interest of “individual self-
realization”).  
 108. For a related overinclusivity-based critique of this aspect of Spence, see Robert 
C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1251–53 (1994). 
 109. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 52 (1989).  
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for example, outside of the territory to patrol. The conclusion that 
most of the law punishing verbal commission or participation in 
crimes does not implicate the First Amendment is justified 
because even though that speech is the product of decisional 
autonomy, the primary interest in deciding to make it—the 
speaker’s interest in the communicative act—is to facilitate 
private gain, usually (though not always) at the expense of 
another, or to otherwise infringe on another person’s autonomy 
in a way that the criminal law protects.110 
In application, Tushnet’s ticket scalper may have decided to 
scalp over other forms of income because he believes 
Ticketmaster and Live Nation are evil gougers. My “Yankees 
Suck” T-shirt hawker at Fenway Park certainly believes the 
message on his shirts to be both true and deserving of wide 
dissemination. At the end of the day, however, the primary fruits 
both intend to come of their labor are not social change, 
monopoly-busting, or relocations from Manhattan to Boston, but 
more cash in their respective pockets. Forcing them to get a 
peddling license, limiting them to certain areas outside the 
ballpark, or banning them altogether at risk of criminal fine 
pursuant to generally applicable laws and regulations are thus 
unproblematic, because their communicative choices to scalp or 
to sell T-shirts with one message over another are not covered, 
even though those acts could be argued to have been products of 
expressive choice. Deciding to wear a T-shirt that contains a 
message is different, even under a choice-based coverage theory, 
than deciding to sell that same shirt. Other factors that serve as 
reliable proxies for speaker intent, such as the form the speech 
takes and the speaker’s desired audience, could potentially play a 
much greater role in coverage questions than they do now.111 
There are also, of course, externalities to constitutional 
coverage for silence—and some of those externalities can be 
negative. To find that the First Amendment materially impedes 
government from forcing individuals to speak, especially in the 
disclosure context, can adversely impact a range of decisions by 
third parties, such as employees’ awareness and understanding of 
their legal rights with respect to safety or other employment terms 
 
 110. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 742–
56 (1989). 
 111. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1145–73 
(2005). 
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and conditions.112 It may be the case that when silence is intended 
to mislead or obfuscate, it can be treated the same way as verbal 
speech intended to do the same, on either the coverage or 
protection end. 
Whether it is information about an employee’s right to 
organize or disclosures to prospective purchasers of a home, 
covering communicative silence should not frustrate societal goals 
that are more important than the individual’s right to withhold 
relevant information.113 In situations like these, distinctions 
between the right to not speak and the right to be free from 
compelled speech can be helpful. With respect to compelled 
disclosures, courts could differentiate between (1) forcing 
someone to speak when they would choose to communicate via 
silence, and (2) “anti-silence” regulatory schemes that recognize 
those circumstances in which protecting silence can entrench 
informational asymmetries that have significant costs for 
prospective listeners. 
The point here is not to provide an all-encompassing answer 
to the issue of First Amendment coverage that fits every case. 
(For example, if the “intent is primarily to get more cash in my 
pocket” from above is my proposed non-coverage rule, then most 
corporate political speech, as well as all of commercial speech, 
would be outside the First Amendment.) Rather, like Tushnet, 
Chen, and Blocher, my goal is to get us asking the question. I also 
hope to show that an autonomy-based rationale for coverage does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that every act should be 
constitutionally covered so long as an argument exists that it was 
intended to be expressive. 
CONCLUSION 
Law professors are granted the gift of being able to give 
sustained and intense study to all manner of judicial 
pronouncements, even the most tossed-off ones. It is therefore 
fairly easy scholarly work to take apart legal assertions that turn 
out to be wrong. In Free Speech Beyond Words, Tushnet, Chen, 
 
 112. See generally Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
31 (2016).  
 113. See, e.g., Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118–19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 161 (AM. LAW INST. 1981), with respect to when a duty 
to disclose, or as the court calls it “a duty to speak,” arises). 
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and Blocher take on a much more challenging assignment: to 
provide support for a legal assertion that is in fact correct. They 
put to the side the questions of content neutrality, overbreadth, 
and governmental motive which occupy so much of the current 
collective thinking about the First Amendment, and focus their 
efforts on a more fundamental question that, despite its 
importance, has so far gone largely ignored: why the 
Amendment’s “freedom of speech” applies to a distorted guitar 
chord, spilled paint on canvas, and Lear’s limericks.114 
In the article that provides the framework for the authors’ 
project, Frederick Schauer writes that “[t]he history of the First 
Amendment is the history of its boundaries.”115 Free Speech 
Beyond Words will stand as an essential signpost in helping 
academics and judges alike to understand where, and just as 
importantly how, those boundaries should be set. 
 
 
 114. See EDWARD LEAR, A BOOK OF NONSENSE (1846). 
 115. Schauer, supra note 21, at 1765.  
